

REMARKS**1. Summary of the Office Action**

Claims 10, 11, 13-29, 31-39, 41-43, 45-59, 61-67, 246-253, and 260-263 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 251 as being an improper recapture of broadened claimed subject matter surrendered in the application for the patent upon which the present reissue is based.

Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the Applicants regard as the invention.

Further, claims 10, 12, 15, 16, 21-26, 28, 33-36, 38, 40, 43, 51-54, 58, 60, 63-66, 260, 262, and 263 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) as being unpatentable over US Patent No. 5,621,456 (hereinafter Florin) in view of US Patent No. 4,734,858 (hereinafter Schlafly).

Further, claims 11, 29, 39, and 59 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) as being unpatentable over Florin and Schlafly, as applied to claims 10, 28, 38 and 58, and further in view of Zachary et al, "Technology: HP is building Gadget to Make TVs Interactive" (hereinafter Zachary).

Claims 13, 14, 17, 31, 32, 41, 42, 45, 61, and 62 also stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) as being unpatentable over Florin and Schlafly, as applied to claims 10, 28, 38 and 58, and further in view of US Patent No. 4,163,255 (hereinafter Pires).

Claim 27 also stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) as being unpatentable over Florin and Schlafly, as applied to claim 26, and further in view of U.S. Patent No. 4,965,825 (hereinafter Harvey.).

Claims 18-20 and 46-48 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) as being unpatentable over Florin and Schlafly, as applied to claims 10 and 38, and further in view of US Patent No. 4,789,895 (hereinafter Mustafa).

2. Response to § 251 Rejection

The Applicants respectfully disagree that the claims identified under this rejection constitute "an improper recapture of broadened claimed subject matter surrendered in the application for the patent on which the present reissue is based" (Office Action, page 2). The Applicants respectfully disagree that any broadening aspects of the reissue claims are related to subject matter that the Applicants previously surrendered, during the prosecution of U.S. Patent No. 5,819,034 (the '034 patent). The Applicant's reasons in connection with this position are set out more fully below.

A failure of a patentee (or a patentee's attorney) to appreciate the full scope of the invention during the prosecution of the original patent application is well recognized as an error correctable by a broadening reissue. See Amos, 953 F.2d at 616, 21 USPQ2d at 1273; In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1519, 222 USPQ 369, 371 (Fed. Cir. 1984). This form of error has generally been accepted as sufficient to satisfy the "error" requirement of § 251. See Clement, 131 F.3d at 1468, 45 USPQ2d at 1163; Wilder, 736 F.2d at 1519, 222 USPQ at 371.

Broadening reissues are subject to the "recapture rule", which is discussed in Clement, 131 F.3d at 1468, 45 USPQ2d at 1164. The recapture rule "prevents a patentee from regaining through reissue . . . subject matter that he surrendered in an effort to obtain allowance of the original claims." Clement, 131 F.3d at 1468, 45 USPQ2d at 1164. The rule is rooted in the "error" requirement in that such a surrender is not the type of correctable "error" contemplated by the reissue statute. See Mentor, 998 F.2d at 995-96, 27 USPQ2d at 1525.

The Federal Circuit, in Clement, 131, F. 3d 1464, 1468-70, 45 USPQ2 at 1161, 1163-65 (Fed. Cir. 1997), stated that an analysis under the recapture rule includes a four-step analysis, namely:

1. Determining whether and in what "aspects" the reissue claims are broader than the claims of the issued patent. A reissue claim that does not include a limitation present in the orginal patent claims is broader in that respect. See id.
2. Determining whether the broader aspects of the reissue claims relate to surrendered subject matter. "To determine whether an applicant surrendered particular subject matter, we look to the prosecution history for arguments and changes to the claims made in an effort to overcome a prior art rejection." See id. at 1469, 45 USPQ2d at 1164.
3. Determining whether the surrendered subject matter has "crept" into the reissue claims.
4. Determining whether the reissue claims are materially narrowed, relative to the claims of the issued patent, in other respects, with a view to determining whether the recapture may be avoided. For example, in Ball Corp. v. United States, the recapture rule was avoided because the reissue claims were sufficiently narrowed (described by the court as "fundamental narrowness") despite the broadened aspects of the claims. 729 F.2d at 1438, 221 USPQ at 296.

Applying the above discussed analysis under the recapture rule to the claims of the present reissue application, it is apparent that the reissue claims are broader than the issued claims of the '034 patent in certain aspects, but also narrower relative to the issued

claims in other respects. Specifically the claims of the present reissue application are directed to facilitating ordering an item using a distributed computer system. Accordingly, limitations of at least the independent claims of the present reissue application are absent from the independent claims of the '034 patent. Consider, for example, the first limitation of independent claim one of the '034 patent, which requires the following:

A source of a data stream providing a series of time division multiplexed packets, ones of which contain auxiliary data that represent a video program, and others of which represent a distributed computing application associated with said video program, and wherein said distributed computing application is repetitively transmitted independent of receiving client computer apparatus during times that said video program is transmitted. ('034 patent, column 14, lines 37-45).

Clearly, claim 10 of the present reissue application does not include a limitation corresponding to the above-identified limitation of claim 1 of the '034 patent, and claim 10 of the present reissue application is accordingly broader in this respect.

On the other hand, consider the following limitation of claim 10 of the reissue claims:

Enabling the user to place an order for the item with a single action with respect to the client, while the item is being offered for sale, the single action being in connection with the order.

The issued claims of the '034 patent do not include a limitation corresponding to the above-identified limitation of claim 10 of the reissue application. In this respect, claim 10 of the reissued claims has been materially narrowed, relative to the claims of the '034 patent. The Applicants believe that this constitutes what is identified as a

"fundamental narrowness", identified in Ball Corp., which avoids the recapture rule, despite broadened aspects of the claims.

Further, as limitations of the issued claims of the '034 patent are not present in the reissue claims, the Applicants believe that the broader aspects of the reissue claims (i.e., the aspects corresponding to limitations in the '034 patent that are absent in the independent claims of the current reissue application) do not relate to surrendered subject matter. This is because the Applicants could not, by way of argument or amendment, surrender subject matter corresponding to the limitations of the present reissue claims in view of the absence of these limitations from the issued claims of the '034 patent. Consider for example that the claims of the '034 patent do not include any limitations directed to enabling "the user to place an order for an item by a single action." Accordingly, the opportunity did not arise during the prosecution of the '034 patent for the Applicants to in fact surrender subject matter pertaining to this limitation. In short, the subject matter of the independent claims of the current reissue application is different from the subject matter of the issued claims of the '034 patent, and the question of recaptured subject matter does not arise. This dovetails with the above position that the reissue claims are sufficiently narrowed, despite the broadened aspects of the claims, so as to avoid the recapture rule.

In conclusion, the Applicants believe that the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 251 has been fully addressed, and withdrawal of this rejection is requested.

The Applicants note that the Office Action states that "[a]t a minimum, the claims require at least one of the following limitations which were argued as the patentable feature for the issued independent claims 1, 6, 7, and 9 in the 08/233,098 application", whereafter the limitations of the identified independent claims are listed (Office Action, pages 3-5). The Applicants fail to fully understand the reason for this alleged requirement. The Applicants also draw the Examiner's attention to the co-pending divisional reissue application serial number 09/903,458, in which claims corresponding to the issued claims of the '034 patent are presented. It will be recalled that, on the

suggestion of the Examiner, a number of divisional reissue applications were filed based off the current reissue application, each of these divisional applications including claims that were originally included in the current reissue application. Claims corresponding to the claims of the divisional reissue applications were then cancelled from the current reissue application, by way of a preliminary amendment dated April 13, 2001.

By requiring that a limitation in the claims of the '034 be present in the claims of the present reissue application, we speculate that reference is being made to the "original invention" requirement. We below quote the pertinent section (1412.01) from the MPEP:

1412.01 Reissue Claims Must Be for Same General Invention

The reissue claims must be for the same invention as that disclosed as being the invention in the original patent, as required by 35 U.S.C. 251. This does not mean that the invention claimed in the reissue must have been claimed in the original patent, although this is evidence that applicants considered it their invention. The entire disclosure, not just the claim(s), is considered in determining what the patentee objectively intended as his or her invention. The proper test as to whether reissue claims are for the same invention as that disclosed as being the invention in the original patent is "an essentially factual inquiry confined to the objective intent manifested by the original patent." *In re Amos*, 953 F.2d 613, 618, 21 USPQ2d 1271, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting *In re Rowand*, 526 F.2d 558, 560, 187 USPQ 487, 489 (CCPA 1975)) (emphasis added). See also *In re Mead*, 581 F.2d 257, 198 USPQ 412 (CCPA 1978). The "original patent" requirement of 35 U.S.C. 251 must be understood in light of *In re Amos*, *supra*, where the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated:

We conclude that, under both *Mead* and *Rowand*, a claim submitted in reissue may be rejected under the "original patent" clause if

the original specification demonstrates, to one skilled in the art, an absence of disclosure sufficient to indicate that a patentee could have claimed the subject matter. Merely finding that the subject matter was "not originally claimed, not an object of the original patent, and not depicted in the drawing," does not answer the essential inquiry under the "original patent" clause of § 251, which is whether one skilled in the art, reading the specification, would identify the subject matter of the new claims as invented and disclosed by the patentees. In short, the absence of an "intent," even if objectively evident from the earlier claims, the drawings, or the original objects of the invention is simply not enough to establish that the new claims are not drawn to the invention disclosed in the original patent.

953 F.2d at 618-19, 21 USPQ2d at 1275. Claims presented in a reissue application are considered to satisfy the requirement of 35 U.S.C. 251 that the claims be "for the invention disclosed in the original patent" where:

(A) the claims presented in the reissue application are described in the original patent specification and enabled by the original patent specification such that 35 U.S.C. 112 first paragraph is satisfied; and

(B) nothing in the original patent specification indicates an intent not to claim the subject matter of the claims presented in the reissue application.

(MPEP 1412.01, Emphasis Added)

The claims of the present reissue application are clearly described in the original patent specification for the '034 patent, and are likewise enabled by the original patent specification for the '034 patent, such that 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is satisfied.

Further, there is nothing in the original patent specification for the '034 patent which indicates an intent not to claim the subject matter of the claims of the present reissue application.

In short, the Applicants do not believe that a limitation from the issued independent claims of the '034 patent is required within the independent claims of the present reissue application in order to satisfy the "original invention" requirement.

3. Response to § 112 Rejection

Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the Applicants regard as the invention.

The Examiner is thanked for identifying this error in the dependency of claim 17. The Applicants have amended claim 17 to be dependent upon claim 10, as correctly assumed by the Examiner.

4. Response to § 103 Rejections

The Applicants respectfully traverse these rejections for the reasons set out below, and ask the Examiner for reconsideration. The Applicants have further also slightly amended the claims to define clearly the intended import of the claims.

To establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, three basic criteria must be met. First, there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) must teach or suggest all the claim limitations. The teaching or suggestion to make the

claimed combination and the reasonable expectation of success must both be found in the prior art, and not based on applicant's disclosure. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 20 USPQ2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

THE PRIOR ART REFERENCES DO NOT TEACH OR SUGGEST ALL CLAIM LIMITATIONS, WHEN CONSIDERED SINGULARLY OR IN COMBINATION.

Taking claim 10 of the present reissue application as an exemplary claim for discussion purposes, the Office Action contends that "Florin does not explicitly disclose:

order the item by a single action with the client; and

wherein the enabling of the user to order the item by a single action includes 1) previously stored user related personal information that is stored in a memory associated with the client for repeated use in enabling further orders for further items to be placed and so that it is not necessary to solicit the user related personal information each time a further order is placed and 2) previously received information related to the item being offered for sale at the time of the single action." (Office Action, page 6-7)

The Office Action then goes on to state that Schlafly discloses ordering of the item by a single action with the user, and points to the disclosures in Schlafly, quoted immediately below, in support of this position:

Once the item has been specified it can be reviewed and modified or it can be stored in a send memory at 92 and later caused to be sent at 94 by automatic dialing of the local processor center 14. Once communication has been established, the entire content of the send memory is transmitted in a burst by

actuation of an internal modem (modulator/demodulator) 96 and the local center commences processing at 98. The send data is initially checked at 98 for verification of some of the data and a return is transmitted the data terminal at 100. The connection is then broken by the LPC and at 102 and the terminal goes "on hook". The message represented by the return is displayed at 104.

(Schlafly, column 7, lines 35-47).

However, immediately preceding the above-quoted disclosure in Schlafly, the below disclosure is provided regarding actions that are required by a user:

Operation of a data terminal 12 in the case of ordering of merchandise from various mail order suppliers is illustrated with FIGS. 3-6. FIG. 4 shows a portion 80 of a page from a Sears catalog. FIG. 5 illustrates a portion 82 of a J.C. Penney Catalog page.

As an example of a catalog order data entry, at 84 in FIG. 3 and after turn on, the user's individual subscriber secret personal authorization number, a four digit number for example, promptly by a word display, is entered. This is followed by sequentially occurring prompts, which permit entry of additional order key actuations in accordance with suitable accompanying operating instructions.

The first set of prompts at 86 calls for the entry of a code specifying the supplier by its catalog and a page number. The second set of prompts at 88 requires specification of the nature of the transaction, e.g. catalog number and special charge and shipping instructions if required. The third set of prompts at 90

requires entry of the quantity and options such as color and size when these are needed to properly specify the desired item.

(Schlafly, column 7, lines 13-34).

Clearly, the ordering of an item, as disclosed in Schlafly, requires more than a single action with respect to the client. Specifically, to perform a catalogue order utilizing the system and methodology disclosed in Schlafly, a user is required to provide an individual subscriber secret personal authorization number, which is followed by sequentially occurring prompts responsive to which the user enters a code specifying a supplier by a catalogue and page number, the nature of the transaction, and the quantity and options pertaining to the relevant order.

In short, Schlafly simply does not disclose placing an order for an item by a single action with respect to a client, but instead clearly discloses a sequence of actions. Schlafly is accordingly cumulative with the disclosures provided in Florin.

Claim 1, as indicated above, has also been amended to include a limitation corresponding substantially to limitations of claims 25 and 26, claim 26 now having been cancelled. Specifically, claim 10 now recites the receiving of data at the client, the data including information to at least one of show and describe the item via the client, and an item identifier to enable the client to identify the item as currently being offered for sale. Claim 10 has also now been amended to recite that the enabling of the user to place the order for the item via the single action includes utilizing the received item identifier.

The above remarks also address the further rejections presented under 35 U.S.C. §103 against the other claims of the present reissue application. Specifically, the further independent claims each include limitations corresponding approximately to those of claim 10. The dependent claims are deemed to include all limitations of claims from which they depend, and the above remarks similarly address the rejections presented under 35 U.S.C. §103 against these dependent claims.

In light of the above, the Applicants respectfully submit that the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103 have been overcome, and withdrawal of these rejections is therefore respectfully requested.


5. Conclusion

Having tendered the above remarks, and amended the claims as indicated herein, the Applicants respectfully submit that all rejections have been addressed and that the claims are now in a condition for allowance, which is earnestly solicited.

If there are any additional charges, please charge Deposit Account No. 02-2666. If a telephone interview would in any way expedite the prosecution of the present application, the Examiner is invited to contact André Marais at (408) 947-8200 ext. 204.

Respectfully submitted,
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